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Introducti011 
In economic models in which agents are asymmetrically informed about the 
structural parameters of the economy the acquisition or manipulation of 
information plays a crucial role. The incentive to affect the flow of 
information is especially important in models in which choice variable., and 
hence market variables, generate information used for future decisions. 
Examples of situations in which the flow of information is generated through 
endogenous (e.g., market) variables are numerous in economics. In these 
situations economic agents adjust their (myopically) optimal decisions in order 
to affect the flow of information. In this paper we study two different 
reasons why agents might change their (myopically) optimal decisions when they 
take account of the informational content of their decisions. The first is 
when informed agents manipulate the informational content of observed market 
variables through their own decisions in order to influence the learning of 
uninformed agents. The second is when uninformed agents "experiment- in order 
to influence the flow of information on which their own future decisions are 
based. 
This paper presents a model in which both of these possibilities - the 
manipulation of information and experimentation - are present. We consider a 
duopoly model with asymmetrically informed agents. In order eo ~ dDe 
simplest case a two period model is used so that information genera~ed in the 
first period may be used in the second period. The market is characterized in 
each period by the same linear demand function. The intercept term of the 
demand curve is assumed to be stochastic. We use the Bayesian Nash equilihriua 
concept and study properties of a separating equilibrium. 
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The information is asymmetric in that each of the firms has different 
information about the stochastic intercept. In particular, one firm - the 
informed firm - knows the expected value ot the intercept term while the other 
the uninformed firm - knows only that the expected value of the intercept term 
can be one of two possible values. The uninformed firm has a subj ective prior 
distribution aver the pair of possible values. 
In the first period each firm chooses a quantity which maximizes the 
expected sum of profits. Second period profitability for both firms depends 
upon the subjective beliefs of the uninformed firm in the second period, i.e., 
on the posterior distribution of the expected value of the intercept of the 
demand function. This posterior distribution, in turn, depends upon the 
quantity decisions of both firms in the first period as well as on the 
observation of the random price. 
The essence of the problem is that the output decisions made by both firms 
in the first period imply a distribution - through the random intercept term ­
of prices. To the uninformed firm two possible price distributions are 
implied, one for each of the two possible values of the unknown parameter. 
Since the randomness of the intercept term obscures the true value of its mean, 
in a separating equilibrium, price observations do not reveal the true value of 
the unknown parameter. Hence an incentive is created for the informed firm to 
manipulate information through its quantity decision. This manipulation is 
designed to make the uninformed firm believe that the market warrants a small 
output (leaving more profit for the informed firm). The potential also exists 
for the uninformed firm to experiment since it too can alter its output to 
yield information about the unknown parameter. Of course, in a Nash 
equilibrium, both firms are aware of the strategies of their opponent so that 
no systematic deception is possible. 
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Unfortunately it is possible in this model that observing quantities (as 
well as prices) could reveal the true value of the unknown parameter to the 
uninformed firm. To see this, notice that •in the first period game there are 
essentially two possible opponents for the uninformed firm, i.e., one opponent 
for each value of the unknown parameter. Each of these opponents can be 
thought of as having a strategy. These strategies yield, in equilibrium, a 
different output level for each of the (opponent) firms. Hence, viewing both 
the market price and the output decisions yields the true nature of the market 
to the uninformed firm. In order to remedy this problem we assume that the 
uninformed firm can not observe the output decision of the informed firm. and 
that the output of the informed firm is random. The mean of the random output 
is the decision variable of the firm. Under this assumption the observation of 
the random output does not reveal the true output strategy of the informed 
firm. Hence, the true value of the expected intercept of the demand function 
remains obscured from the uninformed firm. 
We thus have a model in which the decisions of both the informed and the 
uninformed firm play a crucial role in affecting the observed market variable 
and therefore the informational content of these variables. There are several 
currents in the economic literature which may be considered antecedents of this 
paper. The closest works are "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of 
Private Information and Stochastic Demand" by Matthews and Mirman [MK], 
"Experimental Consumption for a General Class of Disturbance Densities" by 
Fusselman and Mirman [FM] and "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of 
Information and Learning by Doing" by Grossman, Kihlstrom and Mirman [GKK]. 
The Katthews~irman paper can be viewed as the starting point for dhis 
paper since in MM a model of asymmetric information is presented in whic.h the 
firm possessing the information (the incumbent) tries to manupulate the 
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uninformed firm (i.e., the potential entrant) into believing that it is more 
likely that the market has a weak demand, thus reducing it's probability of 
entry. • 
Using the decision variable to manipulate the way information contained in 
the noisy observation of the market variable is interpreted by the firm, is a 
major theme of the paper. The approach of MM is employed in this paper with 
several differences. The first difference is that the value of the second 
period game in MM does not involve the use of the information gleaned by the 
uninformed firm. In MM the uninformed firm observes the relevant variable 
(i.e., the price) updates its information and decides - on the basis of this 
information and their prior beliefs -whether or not to enter. If entry 
occurs, the entrant becomes privy to the information held by the incumbent, in 
this case the value to the informed firm of the second period game does not 
depend on the subjective beliefs of the uninformed firm. In our model the 
value of the second period game depends on the information available to the 
uninformed firm through its posterior probability of the unknown parameter. 
The second difference is that in our model the uninformed firm plays a 
role in the first period. This has two effects. The first is that the 
uninformed firm has an effect on the output and thus may have an influence on 
the informational content of the equilibrium. This yields the uninformed firm 
the opportunity to experiment. It also mitigates. through the Nash equilibrium 
concept, the ability of the informed firm to manipulate. The strategy of the 
uninformed firm must be accounted for in the strategy of the informed firm, 
limiting, to some extent, the effect of manipulation. 
The phenomenon of experimentation is captured in GKM and FM. In these 
papers an uninformed agent changes his myopically optimal strategy in order to 
acquire information (experiment) for his own future use. The potential for the 
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uninformed firm co experimenc exiscs in chis paper since che uninformed firm 
finds ic useful co acquire informaCion in order to make better informed 
decisions in the future as well as co count~racc the effect of the manipulation 
by the informed firm. Thus the uninformed firm may give up profit in order to 
get information for the second period. However despite these incentives it is 
interescing thac there is no experimencacion. The reason is chat ic is the 
mean that is unknown. In chis case all levels of output of che informed firm 
yields che same informacion. However, the output decision of the informed firm 
do have an effect on the uninformed firm even in chis case. 
The other consequence of che facc chat the uninformed firm plays a role in 
the firsc period is that quantities rather than prices must be the decision 
variable in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the type we study. Since Matchews 
and Mirman use prices, an interesting question arises. How do our results 
compare to the MK results? It is shown in MM limit pricing is optimal, i.e., 
in MM the optimal policy for the informed firm is to reduce the price from its 
myopic level. The incumbent does not take account of the informational 
implementation of its decision in making myopic decisions. It is shown in this 
paper, under similar assumptions, that manipulation leads the informed firm to 
increase its output. On the surface chese two results seem contradictory since 
price and quantity move in opposite directions along the demand curve. However 
the results are consistent since the response to a lowering of the intercept 
term in the demand function in the perfect information monopoly case reduces 
both the price and the quantity. Hence, it would seem that in the case of 
asymmetric information the key to how the decision is affected depends on the 
choice variable being used and the signal which is observed. Since each paper 
makes a different assumption it is not surprising that the results are 
different. 
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1. The Model and Preliminary Results 
We consider a two period duopoly model with asymmetric information about a 
parameter of the stochastic linear demand function. One firm - the informed 
firm - knows the actual expected value of the intercept term while the other 
the uninformed firm - does not know this value. However the uninformed firm 
has a subjective probability distribution over the possible values of the mean 
of the intercept term. Output is a random function of the choice of the 
informed firm. The uninformed firm uses the information contained in the 
observation of prices and quantities to update its beliefs about the unknown 
parameter in the demand function. 
AsSUl!PtioDS 
We make the following assumptions: 
1) 	 A duopolistic market is assumed. Each firm has a two period planning 
horizon. 
2) 	 The stochastic linear demand function in each period for this market is 
given by 
P - 0 + t -bQ, 
where 0 is the mean of the unknown intercept parameter whose values belong 
to the set {t 7J}, 7f > O. In order to insure interior solutions it is also 
assumed that 7f < 30. The noise variable € has support on the real line 
with distribution function F(f), density function f(f) and E(f) - O. The 
noise terms are assumed to be independent and identically distributed in 
each period. The derivative of f exits and is continuous. All these 
assumptions on the distribution of f are common knowledge 
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3) There is no possibility of entry or exit 
4) The two firms produce the same homogeneous product in each of the two 
5) 
periods. 
Firm 1, the informed firm, knows the •true value of O. The choice of this 
firm is denoted by ql (OS - ql' if 0 - 7f, ql (0) - St, if 0 ­ ! and ql (0) if 
9 is not specified. Firm 2, the uninformed firm, has an a priori belief 
func tion over {O, 7J} i. e., p - Prob {fJ-7J} and l--(J - Prob {IJ-D}. The choice 
of firm 2 is denoted by q2' Let Ql (71) - Ql - ql + Q2' Ql (!2 - ~ - St + 
q2 and Q(D) - ql(O) + Q2' 
6) There are no costs. 
7) Firms maximize expected profits. 
8) The actual output of firm 1 is a random function of its choice i.e., 
For simplicity the output of firm two is assumed to be deterministic The 
noise term ~ is distributed on the real line. 1 Let H(~) be the distribution 
function of ~ with h(~) the corresponding density function. h is 
independent of Q, and has a continuous first derivative. Moreover E(~) ­
O. All this information is common knowledge. 
9) The density functions f(~Q) and h(Q-Q(O» have the monotone likelihood 
i.e., 	f ( P-1J+bQ) 7fratio 	property (MLRP) f(P~bQ) is nondecreasing in P whenever > 0 
h(q-O§)
and h(~) is nondecreasing in Q whenever Q > Q. 
10) 	 The prior beliefs of Firm II are updated using Bayes Rule as information 
is acquired. The only additional information available to each firm after 
~nder this assumption actual output may be negative. However, on average 
output is positive. A full discussion of this assumption appears in the 
conclusion. 
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the first stage of the game is both the market clearing price and output, 
i.e. there are two signals in the model P, the actual price and Q, the 
actual output. • 
Def1X1 ti.QD 1: A pure strategy in the first period for Firm I is a mapping 
' 
ql: {ir,0} ~ R+. A pure strategy in the first period for Firm II is a mapping 
+q2: [0 t I ] ~ R . 
Note that since Firm II does not know the value of 0, its strategies, q2' 
cannot depend on 0, i.e., given p, a strategy of Firm II is an output q2 e R+. 
In order to find properties of the first period strategies it is necessary 
to study the second period equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium which 
incorporates the information from the first period. Thus we first consider the 
second period problem. Note that since the second period is the last period of 
the planning horizon only the static game need be considered. 
Let p represent beliefs of Firm II in the second period game. Given an 
output q2 the expected profits for Firm I, are 
and if the expected strategies of firm i are q1' ~I the expected profits for 
Firm II are, 
II2(q1' ~, q2) - pJJ(lf + f -b(q1 + q2 + t'»q2 f (f)h(t')dtcip 
+ (1-p)J J (!. + t - b (~ + q2 + t'» q2 f ( t) h (p) dtdt'. (2) 
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Definition 2: 
* *
.-ItGiven p, a second period equilibrium is a triple (ql' ~, q2) such that 
for each 0 l (I, O), and all ql' q2 f R+ • 
and 
Note that the dependence of these values on P is suppressed. 
The assumption that the demand curves are linear implies, in this static 
game, that there is a unique equilibrium. Hence equilibrium expected profits 
of both firms are well defined and can be expressed as functions of p. Let the 
expected equilibrium profit function for Firm I be, 
(3) 
and for Firm II, 
(4) 

We shall now compute.the value functions Vl(P,O), V (P). Let the reaction2
function for Firm I be denoted by ql(q2'O) - Argmax ITl (ql,q2'O). The best 
ql 
response for Firm II, if the expected strategies of Firm I are ql and~, is 
denoted by, 
q2 (ql q .. ', P) - Argmax II (-q q.. q ) ' -:t., 2 l' -:t.,' 2 . 
q2 
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A 
Let 0 - p7f + (1-1') O. 
Team' 1. The reaction curves of Firm I are~ 
and the best response for Firm II is, 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Proof. 
The first order conditions for the maximization of IT1(O) , 0 - tr, ~ 
respectively, yields (5) and (6). Similarly, the first order condition for the 
maximization of IT2 yields (7). 
Given Firm I's reaction function and Firm II's best response function, the 
equilibrium may be viewed in terms of self-confirming conjectures. If Fir.m I 
. th * 0conjectures at Firm II chooses q2' then its best response, given ,is to 
* *choose ql{O). In turn, if Firm II believes that Firm I chooses ql(O) , 0 - tr,O, 
then its best response is to choose q2'* In equilibrium each firm's conjecture 
about the behavior of the other firm is correct, 
Proposition 1. For each p, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by the 
II 
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(8) 

A 
3(J - 0 
(9)6b 
(10) 
Proof. Since in equilibrium each firm's conjectures about the other firms 
behavior is correct, we solve the system of equations (5), (6) and (7) 
simultaneously. This yields (8), (9), and (10). 
Note that since T < 3D, ql > 0, ~ > 0, The value functions are 
(11) 
(12) 
and, 
A 
~ * * 1 (J 2 
V2 (P) - II2 (Ql,9.1,Q2) - b (3' (13) 
T.." 2. 
(i) The functions V1 (P), ~l(P) are decreasing convex functions of p. 

(i1) Also V' < V' and V' < -V"
1 -1 1 l' 
(iii) The function V2(P) is an increasing convex function. 
II 
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Since V' and ~' are both negative, Firm I's interest is that p be as small 
as possible. Since the signals P and Q are endogenous or dependent on an 
endogenous variable, Firm I would like to manipulate them to its own advantage 
by the choice of outputs in the first stage of the game, i.e., it will try to 
control Firm II's learning process. Firm I chooses its quantities so that Firm 
II will interpret the market signals it receives to its own (Firm I's) 
advantage. To follow this behavior, however, is not costless. Firm I must 
take account of the tradeoff between present and future profits. In other 
words, Firm I's problem is one of optimal disclosure of information, over time, 
consistent with profit maximization. 
2. The First Period and the Flow of Information 
After the first period P and Q are observed. Firm II uses these signals 
to update its prior beliefs. In this way a posterior expectation function is 
determined. 
Definition 3. A belief or expectation function p is a mapping from R x R ~ 
[0,1]. Interpret P(P,Q) as the Firm II's subjective probability that 0 - U, 
when P and Q are observed. 2 
2Note that there is a slight abuse of notation. The value p is used to 
represent the subjective beliefs of Firm II in both the first and the second 
period. From this point on p represents the beliefs of Firm II in the first 
period while p(P,Q) is the posterior belief function used in the second period. 
__ __ 
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Definition 4. A belief function P(P,Q) is called consistent if for 0 f {U, ~}, 
and for any observed P and Q,3 
P [f} - 7f, p - P, Q- Q] 
p(P,Q) - Pp[O - 7lli? - P, Q- Q] ­
Pp[P - P, Q- Q] 
_ PP [0 - 1: Y+ f - bQ - P, Q + P. - Q] 
Pp( 0 - 1: 7r + f - bQ - P, Q + p. - Q] + P [f} - f}, f} + f + bQ - P, 9.. + p. - Q]P -­
____________~P~f~(_P_- Y_+~b~Q~)h~(~Q~- Q~)__________~4 (14) 
Pf(P -7r + bQ)h(Q -Q) + (1 - P)f(P -!L + bQ)h(Q -Q) 
Consistent beliefs are generated by Bayesian updating. Let expected 
profits in the first period, for Firm I, be, 
and for Firm II 
II2 (ql' ~, q2) - pff[ (Y + f -b(ql + q2 + p.) )q2] f(f) h(P.) df dp. 
+ (l-p)ff[ (!L + € -b(S:t + q2 + P.»q2] f(f) h(J.') df dp.. 
3The notation Pp denotes the posterior probability for a firm whose prior is p, 
i. e., Pp( 0 - 11 i? - P, Q- Q] is the posterior probability 0 - 7f after P and Q 
are observed, if prior beliefs are given by p. 
4Recall that Q - Q(~ and 9.. - Q(O). 
SAgain a slight abuse of notation is employed. Profits in both periods are 
denoted by the same symbol. No confusion should arise since from here on only 
the second period value function will be used. 
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The problem faced by Firm I is, 
(15) 
where 
(16) 
Similarly, the problem faced by Firm II is, 
(17) 

where 
EV2[P(P,Q)] - pIIV2 [p(p,O)] f (P~ + bQ) h(Q-ql-q2) dP dQ 
+ (l-(J)II V2[P(P,Q)] f (p-IJ + bQ) h(~-q2) dP dQ (18) 
-:it * *Definition 5, An equilibrium is a triple (ql' ~, q2) and a belief function 
p(P,Q) such that 
and 
- 15 ­
(ii) P(P,Q) is consistent. 
Before solving the first period problem, let us consider the flow of 
information. Given the observation (P,Q) in the market space, the noise term f 
in the demand function makes it impossible for Firm II to deduce the true value 
of O. In particular, corresponding to the observation (P,Q), there exists f 
and f such that P - 7f + T - bQ - !L + £ - bQ. Hence the pair (£,1) and (!.z 0) 
cannot be distinguished. A simi1iar statement can be made about observations Q 
in the strategy space, i. e., for each Q there exists Ii and I!. such that Q - Q + 
/J - 5l.. + I:!: Hence the pair (/-" Q) and (l!:.! Q) cannot be distinguished. 
Firm II updates its prior beliefs on the basis of the observation (P,Q) 
using Bayes rule. Hence the posterior probability that 0 - tris, 
Pf(P...:q- + bQ) h(~) 
p(P ,Q) - ------------------- (19) 
Pf(P...:g- + bQ) h(~) + (1-tJ) f (P-O + bQ) h(~) 
It has been assumed that both families of densities f(pIO,Q) and h(QIQ(O» 
have the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) , that means that the ratio 
f(P-1i + bQ) 7r --:.---~- is a nondecreasing function of P, since for all Q, v-bQ > !L -bQ, 
f(P-O + bQ) 
&the expected value functions in (i) are defined in (16). The left hand side 
* * inis taken using ql(O), q2 while the right hand side is taken using Q1(O) , q2* 
the argument of h in (16) *for the first inequality and Q1(O) , Q2 for the second 
inequality. 
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i.e., since tr> O. The MLRP implies that, given Q, observing higher prices 
increases the subjective probability that 0 - Ffor Firm II. The MLRP 
assumption also implies that the ratio :~~ is a nondecreasing 
(nonincreasing) function of Q, whenever Q> ~ (Q < Q) i.e., if Q> ~higher 
values of Q also imply a higher probability that 0 - 1r. Note that there is an 
important distinction between the MLRP for f and h. When applied to f the MLRP 
always holds since 0 is an exogenous parameter and F> O. However for the MLRP 
to hold for h either Q> ~ or ~ < Q must hold. Since Q is an endogenous 
variable the relationship between Q and ~ must be established. In the 
following proofs the inequality will be assumed. However, it will be 
established subsequently. 
Consider the change in the expectation function P(P,Q) when either P or Q 
changes. The following expressions will be needed when studying the 
maximization problem for each firm in the first stage of the game. Let 0 ­
f(P..:{f + bQ) h(Q-fl)p + f(P-IJ + bQ) h(~ (l-p). 
Lftmma 3. If the densities (f(pIO,Q)} have the MLRP, then the expectation 
function P(P,Q) is a nondecreasing function of P. 
Proof. This is clear from equation (19). 
The next Lemma will be used in Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 5. 
Leppa 4. 
(i) 2. P(P ,Q) P(l-p) f(P-1J + bQ) f(P-# + bQ) [-h' (~) h(~)], (20)2Iff 0
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(ii) a p(P Q) _ P(l-p) f(P-4[ + bQ) f(P-O + bQ) [h(~) h' (~)] , (21)~' D2 
Proof. This is clear from equation (19). 
Let f(O) - f(P-O + bQ}, f'(O) - a~o). h(O) - h(~(O» and 
h' (0) - Oh~) , and f(1) - f(p-::iT + hQ} f h(1) - h(~), etc. 
Proposition 2. If the densities (f(pIO,Q)} and (h(QIQ(O)} have the MLRP and if 
if > ~ then P(P ,Q) is a nondecreasing function of Q. Moreover, 
Proof. From equation (19), 

~ - {P [ f}f~1) h (1) + f (1) ~1) ][ f (F)h ( F) p + f ( II)h ( (1)( I-p) 1 

af 7n 8h 7n af( 0) 
- f (1) h ( 1)P[ ~) h ( 1)P + f ( F) ;iJ. )p + IJ5- h ( 0) (l-p) + f ( 0) 
- {[P b f' (1) h (1) + f (1) h' (1) ) ] [f(1) h (F) P + f ( 0) h ( 0) ( l-p) ] 
-f(1)h(7J)P(bf'(1)h(1)p + f(1)h'(F)p + bf'(O)h(O)(l-p) + f(O)h'(O)(l-p)]} 1 ,2D 
After cancelling terms, 
1L _ P( 1=fJ) {b [ f' (1) f (0) - f (1) f' ( 0)] h ( 1)h ( 0)
iJQ D2 
+ f ( 1) f ( 0) [h' (1) h (0) - h ( 1)h' (0) ] } , (22) 
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The sign of ~depends on the sign of the terms [f' (1)f(O) -f(1)f' (O)} 
and [h' (1)h(O) -h(1)h' (0)]. By the MLRP 	 the first of the above terms is 
ah(~) h' (1)h( 0) - h(T)h I (0) 
nonnegative. Similarly if Q> Q, then (jfh(~ ----------------~ 0, 
(h( 0) ) 2 
ai.e. , [h' (1)h(O) -h(1)h' (0)] ~ 0. Hence, 7ff~ o. Finally, 
ap~. g) _ b *"+ f(F)f( O)[h' (F)h( 0) - h(F)h' (0) 1 P(~l) 
- b *"-- [~+ ~ (23) 
Vu-!a 5. 
Proof. From Bayes rule, 
P(P ,Q) 
f(P~bQ)h(Q-ql-q2)P 
- --------------------.,;.,.--------------­
f(P~bQ)h(Q-ql-q2)P+f(P~bQ)h(~-q2)(l-p) 
Hence, 
1 
02 
- {-f (1)h' (1) P( f ( 1) h ( 1) p + f ( 0) h ( 0) (l_p) ] 
- f(1)h(1)P[ -f(1)h' (1)p - f( O)h' (0) (l_p) ]} 	 L20
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Cancelling and rearranging yields, 
(24) 
by Lemma 4. 
3. First Order Conditions 
For any quantity q2 the best responses for Firm I in the first period is 
ql(q2;0) € Argmax ( ITl (Ql,Q2'0) + EVl[P(P,Q),O]} (25) 
Ql 
The best response of Firm II in the first period is, 
q2(ql(U),ql(0)) € Argmax (II2 (Ql(U),Q1(0),Q2) + EV2 [P(P,Q)]} (26) 
q2 
In theorem 1 it is shown that for every level of Q2' if 
then the best responses (i.e., Q1 and ~) for Firm I will occur where first 
period profits IT, (Ql' Q2' 0) have a nonnegative slope. The question of when 
Q > SLwill be postponed. Theorem 1 also shows that Firm II never experiments, 
i.e. it chooses that level of output which maximizes only first period expected 
profits. 
- -
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Theore. I. If Q > ~ then let ql - ql (q2' 7J), ~ - ql (q2' 0), and q2 - q2 (ql ,~) 
be the best reponses of Firm I and Firm II respectively, then 
(i) (27) 
an (.9.:t q2' 0) 
1 f)' - - II~ (p(P,Q) ]f(P-#+bQ)h' (~ dP dQ ~ 0(ii) (28) 
~ 
where Q - ql + q2' ~ - ~ + q2· Also, 
(iii) 
- 0 . (29) 
Before proving theorem 1, the fO,llowing results are needed. 
aT,f!'.a 6, If Q> Q, then CQ (JVl [P(P ,Q) ,0] f(P-D+bQ)dP} :S O. (30) 
Proof. 
- IVi (P(P, Q). 9] ~ f(l'--#+bQ)dP + IV1 (P(P ,Q) ,9] ~ f(l'--#+bQ) dP. (31) 
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Integrating the last term on the right hand side of (31) by parts yields, 
By equation (33) of proposition 2, 
TIlus , 
~ {fV1[P(P,Q),0]f(P~bQ)dP} 
- p(1'7){Vi [P(P, Q) ,0] f(7J) f( 0) [h' (7J)h( O)--h(F)h' (0) ] f(P~bQ) dP. (33) 
D 
By Lemma 2, Vi < 0, and by the assumption that Q > Q, and the MLRP of the 
densities {h(QIQ(O)}, [h'(7J)h(O) -h(F)h'(O)} ~ 0. Thus 
~Vl[P(P,Q),OJf(P~Q)dP s O. II 
Le1lllM 7: If Q> Q, 
(34) 
Proof. TIle MLRP implies that there exists Q t (~,~) such that h'(Q) ~ 0, 
~ ~ 
Q s Q and h'(Q) s 0, Q ~ Q. Moreover, from Lemma 6, fVl[p(p,Q),O]f(P-D+bQ)dP 
A 
is a nonincreasing, positive function of Q. Hence, since h' > 0 when Q < Q, 
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Q 
I{IV1[P(P,Q),8]f(P-U+bQ)dP}h/(~(8»dQ 
--eo 
Q A 
~ I{IV1[P(P,Q),8]f(P-O+bQ)dP}h/(~(8»dQ 
--eo 
A Q 
- (IV1[P(PIQ),8]f(P-8+bQ)dP}Ih(~(8»dQ (35) 
--eo 
Also, since h' < 0 when Q > Q, 
co 
f{JV1[P(PIQ),8]f(P-#+bQ)dP}h/(~(8»dQ 
Q 
A co 
~ ~JV1[P(P,Q),8]f(P-O+bQ)dPJfh(~(8»dQ. (36) 
Q 
Adding equations (35) and (36) yields, 
J(JV1[P(p,Q),8]f(P-#+bQ)dP}h'(~(8»dQ 
A 
Q 
- I[IV1[P(PIQ),8]f(P-#+bQ)dP}h'(~(8»dQ + 
--eo 
co 
+ f{JV1[P(P,Q),8]f(P-U+bQ)dP}h/(Q~(8»dQ 
Q 
A a)Q 
~ {JV1[P(P,Q),8]f(P-O+bQ)dP}[Jh/(~(8»dQ + [h/(~(8»dQ] 
--eo Q 
" 
- (JV[P(p,Q),8]f(P-O+bQ)dP}Jh/(~(8»dQ - 0, 
since Jh'(~(8»dQ - o. //(37) 
Next let rr;. - I1(ql' Q2' 71) and ~ - ITl (ql' q2' 8). We return to the proof of 
theorem 1. 
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Proof of Theorem 1, 
( i) o - :f-+ ~ {IfV';. [p(P ,Q) 1f(P~Q)h(Q-qf-q2)dPdQ}
ql ql _. 
- :f- - flfV';. [P(P. Q) l'f(P~bQ)dP)h' (Q-<l1"'~2)dQ . (38) 
ql 
By LeDDDa 7, I(fV';. [P(P ,Q)] f(P~bQ)dP}h' (~)dQ :s O. Thus, 
arr.: ~- It.rv1p(p,Q)lf(P~bQ)dP}h'(~)dQ;;:: O. 
ql 
The first order condition for a maximum for Firm II for arbitrary ql and ~ is, 
an2(ql'~' q2) 
o ­ aq2 
+ ~pffV2[P(P.Q)lf(P~bQ)h(Q-<l1-q2)dP dQ 
+ (l+p)IIVz[p(P,Q)]f(P~bQ)h(~-qZ)dP dQ) 
an 
- ~+ pIIVi ~f(P~bQ)h(Q-ql-qZ)dP dQq2 qz 
+ (1~)fjv2 ~ f(P-B+bQ)h(~-q2)dP dQ 
Z 
a 
+ pIIvzf(P--1I+bQ) oa::h(Qf-q-qZ)dP dQ qz 
+ (1~)ffv2f(P-B+bQ) ~(Q-sL-q2)dP dQ. (39) 
z 
Integration of the last two terms of the above expression by parts with 
u - IV2f(P~bQ)dP, and dv - ~(Q-ql(.O)-qZ)dQ yields, 
qz 
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an 
o - ~+ pffv2~(P -7J+bQ)h(Q-ql-q2)dPdQq2 q2 
+ (l"'"1')ffVi~ f(P-8+bQ)h(~-«2)dPdQ 
- [pJ( WV2f(~bQ)dP}h(Q-ql-«2)dQ + (1"'"1')J(WV2f(p-iJ+bQ)dP}h(~-«2)dQl 
an 
- ~+ pffvi ~(P-4J+bQ)h(~)dPdQ + (l-p)ffvi ~(p-iJ+bQ)h(~ )dPdQ
q2 q2 q2 

-pJ(Jvi ~(~bQ)dP + JV2bf' (~bQ)dPlh(Q-ql-«2)dQ 

- (l-p)f{fvi ~(p-iJ+bQ)dP 

+ fV2bf'(p-iJ+bQ)dP)h(~-q2)dQ· 
Integration of fV2bf'(P~bQ)dP by parts, yields, 
an 
o - ~+ pffv2¥a: f(P-1J+bQ)h(~)dPdQ + (1-tJ)ffV 2' ~(P~bQ)h(~)dP dQq2 q2 Oqi 
+ pffV2[~-~f(~bQ)h(~)dP dQ 
+ (l-tJ)ffVi[~-b ~f(p-iJ+bQ)h(~)dP dQ. 
Rearranging terms, 
By Lemma 5, ~- [)p + ~ and by Proposition 2, ~- b ~ - [[)p + ~. 
2 ~ - ~ ­
a a a a a a a a a aIT2 
Thus, [~+ ~-b ~ - ~+ ~+ b ~-~-~-b ~- O. Hence oq-;-- O. 
Note that this part of theorem 1 does not depend on the hypothesis Cf> Q. II 
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Theorem 1 relies on the MLRP of both the conditional densities (f(pIO,Q)} 
and (h(Q IQ( 0») as well as on the condition Q> Q, Thus, in order to apply 
theorem 1 it is necessary to show that Q- ql + q2> Sot + q2 - ~ Alternatively 
it must be shown that, ql > Sot' for every q2' 
(41) 
Proof. 
Suppose that ql - Sot' then h{QIQ) - h{Q-ql-q2) - h{~-q2) - h{Q~g), and 
f{P~bQ)h(Q-ql-q2) P 
p(P ,Q) - ---------..:::.........;~------­
f(P-i+bQ)h{Q-ql-q2)P + f(P~bQ)h(~-q2)(1-P) 
f(P-4J+bQ)P 
f{P-4J+bQ)P + f(P-#+bQ)(l-p) 
Hence, in this case, ~- b ~ (c.f. Proposition 2). 
Moreover, 
- -
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Since t- b ~ 
(c.f. Lemma 7, equation (32». Thus, Iv [p(p,Q),O]f(P-8+bQ)dP is constant for1 
all Q. This implies that, 
I{Iv[p(p,Q),O]f(P~bQ)dP)h'(Q-ql(O)-q2)dQ 
- (IV[P(P,Q),O]f(P-8+bQ)dP)Ih'(~(O»dQ - ° 
Therefore, 
Since ITl (ql(O),q2'O) - II(0+(-b(ql(O)+q2+~»(ql(O) + ~)f(l)h(~)dl ~ 
and E(l) - E(~) - 0, 
(43) 
Combining these values, ql -.9... - Th> 0, contradicting the assumption 
that ql - ~. II 
The next theorem shows that, ql(O) is in fact increasing. 
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Theorem 2. For each q2' (again ql (q2,1) - ql and ql (q2' O) - ~). 
ql > ~ 
Proof. Consider the pairs (T,ql)' (t.9..t) and suppose that ql < .9..t (ql '" .9..t by 
lemma 8). Since ql' .9..t are best responses, for the given q2' 
rr;. (ql' q2) + ffV';. f(P--1J+bQ)h(~)dP dQ ~ 
rr;. (~,q2) + fJVf(P--1J+bQ)h(~)dP dQ, 
and 
Hence, 
and 
Let W(Q) - JVl f(P--1J+bQ)dP and Y(Q) - f~f(P-D+bQ)dP (Y(Q,O) is defined 
similarly) . 
" Then, from 	(11) and (12), (recalling that 0 - p (~) + 0», 
W(Q) - W(Q) 	 - fV';. f(P--1J+bQ)dP - f~ f(P--IJ+bQ)dP 
- 3~b[f(37J:-#)2f(P--1J+bQ)dP - f(3iJ-O)2 f (P-IJ+bQ)dP]. (45) 
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After algebraic manipulation, equation (45) becomes, 
(7f-D) 
W(Q) -W(Q) - 36b (9~ + 3!L + 2!LIpf(P-if-bQ)dP + 4!LIpf(P-/J+bQ)dP 
+ (i"-O) Ip2[f(P--7J+bQ) - f(P-/J+bQ) ]dP - 6iJPf(lY1+bQ)dP}. (46) 
Note that since the densities (f(pIO,Q)} have the MLRP there exists a Q 
" " 
such that [f(p-:1Ji-bQ) - f(P--!&bQ)] > 0 « 0) if Q < Q (if Q > Q). The fact that 
~> 0 and I[f(lY1+bQ) - f(P-D+bQ) ]dP - 0 implies that 
I p2 [f(P--1/+bQ) - f(P-/J+bQ) ] dP < o. 
Thus all the terms on the r.h.s. of equation (46) are nonnegative but the last 
one. However, since p f [ 0 , l], -6"'ij"pf(P--1/+bQ) > - 67T, 
(7HJ) 
W(Q) -W(Q) > 36;- (3("Y+O) + (J:..(J) Ip2[f(P--7J+bQ) -£(P-8+bQ)]dP 
(47)
+ 2~Pf(P--7J+bQ)dP + 4~Pf(P-#+bQ)dP) > 0 
Now suppose that, ~ > ql' then by Lemma 6, equation (33), 
The inequality follows since Vi(' ,0) < 0, by Lemma 2, 9L> Q by assumption, and 
the dens i ties { h ( Q ( Q ( 0) )} have the MLRP, i . e., [h' (11) h (0) - h ( 71) h' (0)] :s O. 
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Thus the functions W(Q) and W(Q) are nondecreasing. Since W(Q) > W(Q), 
the HLRP implies that, 
jW(Q) [h(~ ~(~)]dQ ~ JW(Q) [h(~) -h(~) ]dQ. (48) 
But, by equation (48), this means that 
(49) 
i. e. , 
(T -bq -bq )q - (1" -bQ.. -bq )Q .. > (0 -b-q -bq)q - (0 -bQ.. -bq )Q ..1 2 1 ~ 2~- - 1 2 1 - ~ 2"4. 
Hence 
i. e. , 
Since T> It ql - ~ ~ 0, a contradiction. Hence ql > ~. II 
In Lemma 9 the best response functions for Firm I are compared to the 
myopic solutions, i.e. those solutions for which the future is not taken into 
account. These myopic solutions are denoted by a superscript m. Moreover the 
value ql and ql are functions of q2 (i.e., points on the reaction curve) and q2 
depends on the conjectures ql' ~ of Firm II about the choice of Firm I. 
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Le-' 9, 
-m (50)(i) 	 q1 :S q1 ' for all q2 

m
(ii) for all q2 	 (51)
.5Lt:S.5Lt' 
m 	 (52)(iii) q2 - q2 , for all q1' 9..t. 
Proof. 
mt;.(ql,q2) 
(i) By theorem 1, a ~ O. The myopic solution ~ satisfies the 
ql 
aIll (~,q2)
condition, --....,.---- O. Since ~ is concave,
oql 
(ii) 	 Follows similarly. 

all2 
(iii) Again by Theorem 1, 0 - 7J'CJ:' for any given q1' .9.:t. The myopic 
q2 
all2 
solution satisfies 7J'CJ:' - 0 as well. 
q2 
Finally we study the equilibrium outputs and compare the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium outputs to the "myopic" equilibrium outputs, It should be noted 
that even though, from Lemma 9 (iii), q; - q2 for all possible conjectures, the 
output for Firm II is not the same in the Bayesian Nash case and myopic case 
since in these two cases the output of Firm I is different, and the equilibrium 
output of Firm II will reflect this difference. 
The myopic equilibrium outputs are the equilibrium outputs in the one 
period game i.e., 
(53) 
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and, 
(54) 

-r/t * * * * Let ql - ql(i) , ~ - ql«(), Q2' be the equilibrium outputs for Firm I and Firm 
II, respectively, in the first period of the two period game and let 
* * * -m* m* 71\ m* m* ()Q (0) - ql «() + Q2' Similarly let ql - ql (u),.9.... - Ql (..1, 
theorem 3. If the densities (f(pl(),Q)) and {h(QIQ«())} both have the MLRP, 
then, 
(i) 
(ii) 
Proof. The first order conditions can be solved as follows, 
and 
* 
1\ () 1 -« * q2 - "2b-f[PQl + (1-1J)~] . 
Also, 
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and, 
A 
m* U 1 -m* m* 
q2 - 2b -IfPql + (1-fJ)9.:t ] 
Combining these expressions yields, 
(55) 
and 
Hence, 
* m* 1 I rn _ "'iT': -.toq2-q2 - t;{P {Jv1f(r-tM-bQ)dP} h' (Q-f{ )dQ 
+ (1-fJ) {I~ f(P-I}+bQ)dP} h' (~*)dQJ 
* * m*By Lemma 7, I{IV1[p(p,Q),U]f(P-#+bQ)dP} h'(Q-f{ (O»dQ ~ 0, thus q2 ~ q2 
* m*This implies, from (55) that ql (0) s ql (0). / / 
Conclusion 
We have presented a model of a duopolistic market with asymmetric 
information. In this model there is one informed and one uninformed firm. 
Each firm maximizes the sum of two period profits. The second period profit 
function of both the informed and the uninformed firm depend upon the 
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subjective (a posterior) beliefs of the uninformed firm. Hence the potential 
exists for the informed firm to manipulate its ouput and for the uninformed 
firm to experiment. Unfortunately it turns out that the uninformed firm does 
not gain from experimentation -and hence does not experiment. However this 
result of no experimentation depends on the fact that the intercept term, 
rather than, say, the slope, is the unknown parameter. In the unknown 
intercept case the informational content of the decision is independent of the 
output of the uninformed firm. 
This conclusion leads immediately to the question of: when will the 
uninformed firm experiment? It is likely that if the slope is unknown and, as 
above, the output is a random variable whose mean is the choice variable of the 
informed firm, the uninformed firm will experiment. This question has not yet 
been studied. Another interesting question is; can the assumption that output 
is random be dispensed with? The answer to this question is considerably less 
clear and potentially more difficult. The reason that the random output 
assumption is made is that we found it necessary to separate the effect of the 
price signal and the quantity signal in order to invoke the MLRP. This 
separation can best be seen from equation (16). It is seen in (16) that the 
effect of the two variables which are unknown to the uninformed firm, the value 
of e and the decision variable of the informed firm, can be separated. When 
these variables can be separated the MLRP must be invoked twice (once for hand 
once for f). Since T > t the MLRP holds for f. However, in order for the 
MLRP to hold for h it must be shown that Q(O) is monotonic in 0, i.e., Q > Q. 
Both this paper and MM need this monotonicity and it was in fact shown to hold 
in both papers. 
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.1:be alternative assumption - that the uninformed firm does not have any 
information about the output of the informed firm - combines the two unknown 
variables. To be more precise, if in this paper Q were not observed then the 
probability of having seen P given that 0 - 7f and Q - Q is f(P - 7f + bQ). In 
order to invoke the MLRP it is necessary to show that 0 -bQ(O) is monotonic in 
D. Although we have not been able to prove that 0 -bQ(O) is monotonic, it 
appears that it is not necessarily true. In other words, it might be optimal 
for the informed firm to increase as well as decrease its output to manipulate 
the uninformed firm. This remains an open question. 
There are two questions that are important and interesting which has not 
been discussed. The first the effect of asymmetric information on total 
output. We have only studied the effect of asymmetric information on myopic 
decisions for each firm. The second is the question of existence. It appears 
that even stronger conditions than the MLRP is needed on the density functions 
to guarantee the existence of optimal solutions. Finally, examples are hard to 
find. It would be useful to illustrate these results with several simple 
examples. 
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